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The state of the law regarding refugees in the United States has been 
characterized in the recent past by inconsistent rulings among the Circuit Courts, and 
narrow applications of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which provides the 
basis for asylum eligibility.  In the midst of this sometimes-contradictory application of 
the INA, victims of attempted sex trafficking (those who have faced threats or attempts by 
sex traffickers to force them into sexual slavery) have consistently been rejected for 
asylum by U.S. courts.  Federal courts have uniformly denied these asylum claims by 
ruling that these victims do not meet the INA’s requirement that refugees fall into a 
particular social group.  Therefore, this Comment focuses largely on the argument that 
U.S. courts have interpreted the “social group” provision in an unduly narrow fashion, 
and that victims of attempted trafficking do indeed satisfy this element of the INA’s test 
for asylum eligibility.  This Comment argues that U.S. courts’ rejections of these asylum 
claims are inconsistent with the legislative intent behind the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952, federal case law that has granted asylum petitions in similar contexts, and 
the United Nations’ and international interpretations of refugee law.  Based on these 
reasons and public policy concerns, U.S. courts should recognize the valid claims of 
many of these victims of attempted trafficking, and grant them the asylum that they 
deserve. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While the United States government has stated that human trafficking, and sex 
trafficking in particular, is a grave problem that should not be tolerated, 1  U.S. 
jurisprudence has given insubstantial consideration to the asylum claims of those in 
danger of becoming victims of such trafficking.  Federal courts have reviewed few cases 
involving women who have experienced threats or attempts by sex traffickers to force 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A., English and Spanish, Washington and 
Lee University, 2009. Special thanks to the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy staff (in 
particular Natalie Bump, Claire Hoffmann, and Isidro Mariscal) for their helpful comments and review. 
1 See Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, available at http://
www.state.gov/j/tip/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (“‘It ought to concern every person, because it is a 
debasement of our common humanity. It ought to concern every community, because it tears at our social 
fabric. . . . I’m talking about the injustice, the outrage, of human trafficking, which must be called by its 
true name—modern slavery.’ – President Barack Obama.”).  
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them into sexual slavery, and they have denied asylum to all of these women.2  This 
Comment argues that victims of attempted trafficking should be granted asylum in the 
United States because they meet the elements necessary for a successful asylum claim 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19523 (INA): membership in a “social 
group,” “persecution or well-founded fear of persecution” based on membership in that 
social group, and the inability or unwillingness of the claimant to “avail himself or 
herself of the protection” of his or her country of nationality.4  This Comment analyzes 
this issue with a focus on Albanian victims of attempted trafficking.5 
U.S. jurisprudence on asylum has long been characterized by its substantial 
intricacy and its lack of uniformity across circuits, sometimes even within circuits.6  
While the INA dictates the conditions under which applicants qualify for asylum, the 
proper interpretation of “membership in a particular social group”7 has perplexed U.S. 
courts.  The perceived ambiguity of this language has led courts to implement a variety of 
different tests to determine whether or not applicants making a social group-based claim 
meet asylum requirements. This has led to inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory, 
applications of the law.8  As a result of this unsettled precedent, courts have been hesitant 
to find that the “social group” factor of an asylum claim has been met.9  While there have 
also been varying interpretations as to what constitutes a well-founded fear of persecution 
and an inability of claimants to avail themselves of the protection of their home countries, 
the ambiguity surrounding membership in a social group serves as the largest barrier for 
victims of attempted trafficking.  The failure to consider victims of attempted trafficking 
as a social group excludes them from asylum eligibility without examining the 
circumstances that give rise to their well-founded fear of persecution and inability to 
avail themselves of the protection of their countries. 
For potential victims of human trafficking around the world, this skepticism toward 
social group claims has resulted in a frustrating denial of claims for asylum of trafficking 
targets based on a wide variety of standards. The seemingly arbitrary denial of asylum to 
those targeted by human traffickers is inappropriate for three reasons. First, it is contrary 
to the humanitarian purposes for which Congress passed the Refugee Act of 198010 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See, e.g., Kalaj v. Holder, 319 F. App’x 374 (6th Cir. 2009); Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
3 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
4 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).  
5 This focus provides the best illustration of the problem because the majority of cases in which U.S. Courts 
have examined this issue have involved Albanian victims of attempted trafficking.   
6 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 422 (2007) (citing a study of U.S. Courts of Appeal that found “stunning variability 
from one circuit to another”). 
7 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
8 T. David Parish, Membership in a Particular Social Group Under the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity 
and the Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 923 (1992) (“Current judicial and agency 
standards for judging social group status are vague and contradictory. As a result, courts have been slow to 
invoke this language and inconsistent in applying it.”). 
9 Id.  
10 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C.). 
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(Refugee Act), which amended the INA. Second, it is incompatible with U.S. case law 
governing asylum eligibility in comparable situations.11 Third, it is inconsistent with the 
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees12 and the international 
interpretation of what constitutes membership in a social group with a well-founded fear 
of persecution. By taking greater cognizance of these sources that should and were meant 
to inform courts’ interpretations of the INA and Refugee Act, U.S. courts can finally 
issue sound rulings that recognize potential victims of human trafficking as constituting a  
“social group” with a “well-founded fear of persecution” and an “inability to avail 
[themselves] of the protection” of their native countries, for asylum purposes under the 
INA.13 
II. THE REALITIES OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
In analyzing the asylum claims of victims of attempted trafficking, it is important 
to understand the nature of human trafficking and the persecution victims fear if returned 
to their native countries.  Human trafficking constitutes a modern-day form of slavery,14 
and in the case of sex trafficking includes rape, violence, psychological torment, and even 
the infliction of disease and addiction.15  Disturbingly, human trafficking is the fastest 
growing criminal industry in the world, and it is one of the largest, second only to drug 
trafficking.16  While the highly secretive nature of human trafficking makes it incredibly 
difficult to gather accurate statistics regarding the total number of trafficking victims, 
estimates suggest the number of trafficking victims worldwide is a staggering 12.3 
million people.17  
The United Nations (U.N.) defines “trafficking in persons” as 
 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation.18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Other asylum cases that involved threats or attempts at persecution have been decided in favor of the 
plaintiff.  See, e.g., Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2011). This case is discussed in more detail 
infra text accompanying notes 129-134. 
12 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223 [hereinafter U.N. Protocol]. 
13 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
14 See Kendal Nicole Smith, Human Trafficking and RICO: A New Prosecutorial Hammer in the War on 
Modern Day Slavery, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 759, 760 (2011). 
15 See Theodore R. Sangalis, Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the Sex Trafficked Person Under the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 403, 414-15 (2011). 
16 See Human Trafficking, WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/HumanTrafficking.aspx#.UOoqg45dHqE (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
17 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 7 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/142979.pdf. 
18 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 3(a), Nov. 15, 
2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13127. 
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The U.N. explains further that human trafficking, in general, includes “at a 
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or 
the removal of organs.”19     
Once victims find themselves in the hands of traffickers, they may be subjected to 
rape, violence, and humiliation.  Additionally, many trafficking victims must turn over all 
of their earnings to their traffickers, leaving them economically powerless.20  To exert 
control over these women and to keep them captive, traffickers commonly use 
psychological manipulation, forced drug use, physical and sexual violence,21 in addition 
to threats of violence against the trafficked women’s family members.22 For example, the 
trafficker of one Albanian survivor of sex trafficking “kept her in submission through 
physical abuse--beatings, rape, and slicing her with knives.” 23  Another Albanian 
trafficking survivor stated that after she was successfully abducted, her kidnappers “often 
threatened to kill [her] or harm [her] family if [she] wouldn't comply,”24 and that she 
“was afraid of them as [she] knew they carried guns and were on drugs.”25   
Aside from the physical and psychological torture that these women suffer 
throughout this forced prostitution, many also contract potentially life-threatening 
sexually transmitted infections.26  For example, a Harvard School of Public Health study 
found that approximately thirty-eight percent of Nepalese survivors of human trafficking 
were found to have contracted HIV.27  Furthermore, many traffickers force their victims 
to engage in drug use in order to render them less autonomous and to induce more 
dependency on their traffickers.28   
With regard to targets of human trafficking, sex trafficking primarily affects young 
women.29  According to the U.S. Department of Justice, eighty-seven percent of sex 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Id.  
20 See Michelle Crawford Rickert, Through the Looking Glass: Finding and Freeing Modern-Day Slaves at 
the State Level, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 211, 232 (2010). 
21 See Sangalis, supra note 15, at 414-15 (noting that “[f]orms of physical coercion can include assault, 
burning, or rape”). 
22 Id. at 415; see also Lithuanian Sex Slave’s Bid to Escape Great Yarmouth Trafficker, BBC NEWS 
NORFOLK (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-norfolk-14751842 (explaining that a 
particular trafficking victim’s “motivation for staying was that she was absolutely terrified of what might 
happen to her family in Lithuania and her boyfriend” because of her trafficker’s “regime of threats”).  
23 Sara Elizabeth Dill, Human Trafficking: A Decade's Track Record, Plus Techniques for Prosecutors and 
Police Moving Forward, ABA CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 18, 24. 
24 True Stories: The Story of M., ASS’N OF ALBANIAN GIRLS AND WOMEN, 
http://www.aagw.org/Education/TrueStories/True9M (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
25 Id. 
26 Jonathan Todres, Moving Upstream: The Merits of a Public Health Law Approach to Human Trafficking, 
89 N.C. L. REV. 447, 464-65 (2011). 
27 Id. (citing Jay G. Silverman et al., HIV Prevalence and Predictors of Infection in Sex-Trafficked Nepalese 
Girls and Women, 298 JAMA 536, 538 (2007)). 
28 Sangalis, supra note 15, at 415. 
29 See ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OSCE 2.2.1 (1999), available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/16709#p221 
(“Traffickers tend to target young women and girls in countries or regions where socio-economic 
conditions are difficult and opportunities for women are extremely limited.”). 
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trafficking victims are under the age of twenty-five.30  Additionally, poverty is an 
extremely common trait among trafficking victims and a major cause for the persistence 
of this industry.31 For instance, after the arrest of a Lithuanian trafficker, an English 
police officer noted that he believed the victim “was targeted because of several desirable 
‘business’ factors,” including “her poor education, scant life experience,” and youth.32  
The police report also noted that this woman came from a town with little economic 
opportunity.33   
 
III. REJECTION OF ASYLUM CLAIMS OF VICTIMS OF ATTEMPTED TRAFFICKING BY U.S. 
COURTS AND AGENCIES 
 
Despite the extreme dangers faced by targets of human trafficking, U.S. court 
decisions and administrative adjudications have not been receptive to the asylum claims 
of these victims.  While data on the outcomes of these cases has not been 
comprehensively compiled, the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies collected 
information from about fifty-two administrative and federal judicial decisions on asylum 
claims involving trafficking as of 2007.34  Each of these cases involved asylum claims by 
individuals who had been trafficked, forced into prostitution, or threatened with either of 
these fates.35  The outcomes of these cases included seven grants and four denials at the 
Asylum Office, thirteen grants and twenty-six denials in immigration court, and three 
grants and nine denials at the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).36  With regard to 
cases brought forth by Albanian claimants, which comprise 35 percent of the total, there 
were three grants and two denials at the Asylum Office, four grants and thirteen denials 
in immigration court, and no grants and five denials at the BIA.37  While these statistics 
demonstrate a low rate of success of asylum claims by victims of actual trafficking—as 
well as those of attempted trafficking—there are other recourses available to victims of 
actual trafficking that are not available to victims of attempted trafficking, such as “T- 
visas” under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act38 and relief under 
the Convention Against Torture.39  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUSPECTED HUMAN TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS, 2008-2010 1 (2011), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cshti0810.pdf.	  
31 Sangalis, supra note 15, at 410-11 (“Perhaps the most pervasive of these causes is global poverty, which 
disproportionately affects women and girls.”). 
32 BBC NEWS NORFOLK, supra note 22. 
33 Id. 
34 See Stephen Knight, Asylum from Trafficking: A Failure of Protection, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, July 2007, at 






38 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.). “T-visas endow trafficking victims 
with an assortment of benefits, including medical services and possibly lawful permanent residency after 	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Part of the reason why asylum claims made by victims of attempted trafficking 
have not been successful is that U.S. courts have applied a narrow standard in interpreting 
what constitutes a “social group,” one of the three elements that these claims must set out 
and fulfill.  The dominant standard used to determine the existence of a proper social 
group claim in an asylum application is the “immutable characteristic” standard, 
established by the BIA in In re Acosta in 1985.40  In In re Acosta, the BIA defined an 
immutable characteristic as “beyond the power of an individual to change or . . . so 
fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be 
changed.”41  However, federal courts’ interpretations of what constitutes a social group 
under this standard have been very narrow, in contravention of the various sources of 
law—to be discussed infra Part IV—that should inform courts’ interpretations. 
Rather than relying on proper canons of statutory interpretation to adequately take 
account of these sources of law that should inform their interpretations of the 
immigration laws at issue, U.S. courts have employed arbitrary analyses to determine 
which groups are sufficiently narrow to constitute a particular social group.  Their 
method resembles the discretionary approach afforded to the Attorney General,42 rather 
than a judicial undertaking to determine whether applicants qualify for asylum on the 
basis of the statute itself.  Such subjective analyses for deciding these claims have 
contributed to the substantial inconsistency that characterizes current U.S. asylum law, 
making the system inherently unfair to asylum seekers, whose probabilities of success 
depend on which circuits and which individual judges review their cases.43  Moreover, 
the courts’ emphasis on the narrowness of a social group’s uniting features has the 
troubling result of only protecting small classes of people from persecution, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
three years, similar to the benefits afforded to refugees.” Calvin C. Cheung, Protecting Sex Trafficking 
Victims: Establishing the Persecution Element, 14 ASIAN AM. L.J. 31, 34 (2007). 
39 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2012).  
40 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).  While subsequent BIA decisions such as In re A-
M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74-76 (B.I.A. 2007), have added a requirement that a social group be 
“socially visible,” there is debate about the force of that requirement or the BIA’s meaning of the term.  See 
Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Often it is unclear whether the Board is 
using the term ‘social visibility’ in the literal sense or in the ‘external criterion’ sense, or even whether it 
understands the difference.”). 
41 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. However, some courts, such as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, have rejected this standard and utilized contradictory tests, such as requiring that a social group be 
based on common interests or a voluntary associational relationship.  See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 
801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). 
42 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
43 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et. al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
295, 296 (2007) (citing a study that demonstrated enormous disparities in asylum grant rates at the 
immigration judge level, the Board of Immigration Appeals level, and the federal courts of appeal level.). 
“The analysis reveals amazing disparities in grant rates, even when different adjudicators in the same office 
each considered large numbers of applications from nationals of the same country. For example, in one 
regional asylum office, 60% of the officers decided in favor of Chinese applicants at rates that deviated by 
more than 50% from that region's mean grant rate for Chinese applicants, with some officers granting 
asylum to no Chinese nationals, while other officers granted asylum in as many as 68% of their cases. 
Similarly, Colombian asylum applicants whose cases were adjudicated in the federal immigration court in 
Miami had a 5% chance of prevailing with one of that court's judges and an 88% chance of prevailing 
before another judge in the same building. Half of the Miami judges deviated by more than 50% from the 
court's mean grant rate for Colombian cases.” Id. 
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disregarding oppression that has a broader impact.  As will be discussed later in this piece, 
this highly restrictive interpretation fails to adhere to the principles of humanitarianism 
for which Congress passed the Refugee Act.44   
In addition to, and in conjunction with, this narrow interpretation of what 
constitutes a “social group” for asylum purposes, U.S. case law has also not taken 
adequate account of the specific characteristics that make certain individuals susceptible 
to being targets of sex trafficking, or the substantial danger of being trafficked that they 
face if returned to the country in which they faced a threat or attempt by traffickers. Thus, 
virtually all circuits have rejected the position that victims of attempted trafficking fall 
into a particular social group under the INA. 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Rreshpja v. Gonzales45 exemplifies this rejection of 
social group claims by victims of attempted trafficking. In that case, the Sixth Circuit 
denied asylum to an Albanian woman who was attacked and nearly abducted, but 
managed to break free from her potential kidnapper.46  While the plaintiff was running 
from her attacker, he proclaimed that “she should not get too excited because she would 
end up on her back in Italy, like many other girls.”47  The plaintiff understood this 
statement to be a threat that she would be trafficked and forced into prostitution in the 
future.48 
Despite the prevalence of sex trafficking in Albania and the specific targeting that 
the plaintiff in this case experienced, the Sixth Circuit rejected her social group claim of 
“young (or those who appear to be young), attractive Albanian women who are forced 
into prostitution,” and thus, her claim for asylum.49 The court stated that “a social group 
may not be circularly defined by the fact that it suffers persecution,” and noted that if the 
plaintiff’s social group claim were to be successful, then “virtually any young Albanian 
woman who possesses the subjective criterion of being ‘attractive’ would be eligible for 
asylum.”50 However, while the Sixth Circuit was correct in its assessment that a trait as 
subjective and as prone to change as attractiveness might not have been an appropriate 
defining characteristic of a particular social group, it arguably erred in finding that the 
plaintiff’s claimed social group was defined by its persecution. 
In Kalaj v. Holder,51 the plaintiff’s proffered description of her social group was 
slightly, yet importantly, different from the plaintiff’s claim in Rreshpja.  The plaintiff in 
Kalaj was also an Albanian woman who escaped traffickers who attempted to abduct her 
and force her into prostitution.52 In that case, three men approached the plaintiff in the 
street and asked her if she was interested in working as a waitress in Italy.53   She 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980) (“The Congress 
declares that it is the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to 
persecution in their homelands, including . . . humanitarian assistance for their care and maintenance in 
asylum areas . . . .”). 
45 420 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2005). 
46 Id. at 553. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 555. 
50 Id. at 556. 
51 319 F. App’x 374 (6th Cir. 2009). 
52 Id. at 375. 
53 Id. 
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declined, suspecting that the supposed “waitress” position served as a guise for 
prostitution work.54  In response to her rejection, the men threatened her verbally and 
tried to physically force her into their car.55  Because of the plaintiff’s sheer luck that a 
witness intervened on her behalf, she escaped her would-be captors.56  However, as she 
fled, the men proclaimed that they knew where she lived and would return for her.57 
In her asylum claim, the plaintiff in Kalaj (unlike the plaintiff in Rreshpja) made 
her social group claim on the basis of solely objective characteristics, arguing that “young, 
impoverished, single, uneducated women who risked kidnapping and forced prostitution 
in Albania” formed a particular social group.58  Despite the plaintiff’s use of multiple 
qualifiers besides gender to define her social group, the Sixth Circuit denied the claim, 
explaining that it was not sufficiently narrow.59  In doing so, the court effectively equated 
her social group claim with that in Rreshpja,60 ignoring the fundamental difference 
between the objective qualities of the claim in Kalaj, and the subjective qualities that the 
plaintiff in Rreshpja used for her social group claim.  
Furthermore, the Kalaj court’s reasoning failed to distinguish groups targeted for 
persecution based on membership in that group from groups defined by their persecution.  
In rejecting the plaintiff’s claim, the court made the erroneous declaration that the 
plaintiff’s proposed social group contained no “immutable group trait other than a 
generalized risk to women associated with the reportedly high levels of human trafficking 
in Albania.”61  While it is true that this class of women is particularly susceptible to the 
fate of being trafficked,62 that susceptibility is not the social group’s only common 
immutable characteristic, and it is not what defines them.  In general, traffickers target 
those women for such persecution because they possess the aforementioned qualities of 
youth, poverty, and femaleness63—characteristics that they have no power to change.  
Therefore, in light of the immutability standard for assessing social groups, the Sixth 
Circuit erred in deeming those features insufficient to define a social group. 
Finally, Lushaj v. Holder64 presents an interesting case with regard to the standard 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on to reject the plaintiff’s social group claims. 
As in Rreshpja, the plaintiff in Lushaj was a young Albanian woman—in this case, a 
twelfth grade girl.65 She was abducted by a gang for the purposes of sex trafficking but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Id. 
55 Id. When the plaintiff attempted to run to safety, “[t]he men pursued and caught her and began dragging 
her back to the vehicle.” Id.	  
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 376.  
59 Id. at 377. 
60 Id. at 376 (affirming the BIA’s decision, in which“[r]elying on this Court's decision in Rreshpja v. 
Gonzales . . . [the BIA] conclud[ed] that Kalaj’s claimed membership group did not constitute a ‘particular 
social group’ as that term is contemplated by the INA”).	  
61 Id. 
62 See Crystal Y. Twitty, Pretty Pennies for Pretty Faces: Trafficking of Women for the International Sex 
Trade, 2 REGENT J. INT’L L. 115, 123 (2004). 
63 Id. at 124. 
64 380 F. App’x 41 (2d Cir. 2010). 
65 Id. 
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managed to escape her potential traffickers.66 As part of her asylum claim, the plaintiff in 
Lushaj made her social group claim on the basis of multiple potential social groups, 
including the general group of “young women in Albania” and the more specific group of 
“women who were previously targeted for sex-trafficking by members of the Haklaj gang 
and who managed to escape and avoid capture.”67  In reviewing those claims, the Second 
Circuit deemed reasonable the interpretation that these groups were not defined solely by 
the persecution that their members faced, but that “as a member of this ‘group,’ [the 
plaintiff] had become a potential target of the Haklaj gang.”68 The court, however, 
rejected the asserted social groups because of “the absence of any evidence that such a 
‘group’ was perceived as a discrete group by Albanian society.”69   
The Lushaj court’s use of this “social visibility” test, in addition to the requirement 
of a common innate characteristic, contradicts dominant domestic precedent in the U.S.70 
The dominant and widely-held view of “social group” in U.S. case law requires only that 
the group share an “immutable characteristic.”  That definition does not impose an 
additional requirement that the applicant’s country of origin perceive his or her social 
group as distinct.  While the BIA adopted the social visibility test in In re A-M-E & J-G-
U-,71 many circuits have rejected that standard and noted that it simply does not make 
sense, particularly because those at risk of persecution would likely attempt to mute the 
physical attributes that would label them as part of that persecuted group, and thus 
attempt to hide the characteristics that would lead to their persecution.72  Additionally, 
the immutability standard is the leading view, not only in the United States, but also 
among major common law states around the world. As the following Part will 
demonstrate, this discrepancy is but one of many areas where U.S. courts have failed to 
align themselves with international understandings of refugee law and, in turn, the 
original legislative intent of U.S. refugee statutes. 
IV. INCONSISTENCY WITH THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE REFUGEE ACT 
U.S. courts have denied asylum to victims of attempted trafficking by applying 
narrow standards of what constitutes a “social group” with a “well-founded fear of 
persecution.”  Courts’ standards for analyzing asylum law conflict with the congressional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 43. 
68 Id. It is interesting to note that had the Kalaj court employed this interpretation of what constitutes a 
social group, the plaintiff in that case would have made a successful social group claim. 
69 Id. 
70 See discussion of international interpretations of the definition of “refugee” infra Part VI. 
71 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007). 
72 See Gatmi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir.  2009) (“[The social visibility test] makes no sense; nor 
has the Board attempted, in this or any other case, to explain the reasoning behind the criterion of social 
visibility. Women who have not yet undergone female genital mutilation in tribes that practice it do not 
look different from anyone else. A homosexual in a homophobic society will pass as heterosexual. If you 
are a member of a group that has been targeted for assassination or torture or some other mode of 
persecution, you will take pains to avoid being socially visible; and to the extent that the members of the 
target group are successful in remaining invisible, they will not be ‘seen’ by other people in the society ‘as 
a segment of the population.’”); see also Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, No. 09-71571, 2013 WL 518048 (9th 
Cir. Feb. 13, 2013); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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intent behind the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195273 as well as the Refugee Act 
of 1980,74 which amended the INA. Congress enacted the INA in order to compile the 
scattered mass of U.S. immigration laws into one organized and comprehensive 
doctrine.75   In 1980, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which revised and 
expanded the INA’s procedures for admitting refugees into the country and “establish[ed] 
a statutory right to seek asylum.”76  This amendment defined a “refugee” for asylum 
purposes as 
 
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in 
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which 
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to 
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.77   
 
Under the INA, if an alien meets these qualifications, the United States government 
considers him or her a refugee, and the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney 
General has the discretion to grant that person asylum.78 
While there exists little elaboration in the Refugee Act’s legislative history 
regarding the specific meanings of the terms “social group,” “well-founded fear of 
persecution,” or “inability or unwillingness to avail” oneself of the protection of one’s 
country of origin, the reasons that Congress used that particular language illustrate how 
federal courts should interpret those terms.  According to the Senate Committee Report,79 
Congress inserted this definition of “refugee” into the INA in order to make U.S. asylum 
law conform with the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Convention),80 as well as the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Protocol),81 to which it acceded to in 1968.82 In fact, Congress did not alter much the 
Protocol’s language when Congress added it to U.S. immigration law.83  In copying that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
74 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
75 See H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 5 (1952) (“The purpose of the bill is to enact a comprehensive, revised 
immigration, naturalization, and nationality code.”). 
76 Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right to Seek Asylum in the United States: The Immigration Dilemma 
and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 303, 305 (2001). 
77 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
78 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). 
79 See SEN. REP. NO. 96-256, at 4 (1979). 
80 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter U.N. 
Convention]. 
81 See U.N. Protocol, supra note 12. 
82 See Bobbie Marie Guerra, A Tortured Construction: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act's Express Bar Denying Criminal Aliens Withholding of Deportation Defies the 
Principles of International Law, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 941, 956 (1997). 
83 The U.N. Convention defines refugee as one who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 	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language almost verbatim, Congress accepted an obligation to the people who qualified 
as refugees under the Protocol.84  
In interpreting the Refugee Act in accordance with Congress’ intended meaning, 
the Act’s language must also be read in line with the United Nations’ interpretation of its 
own refugee standards.  The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released 
the Handbook of Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Handbook)85 in 
order to further define the provisions of the Convention and Protocol.  As the Supreme 
Court has stated, the Handbook “provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, 
to which Congress sought to conform . . . and has been widely considered useful in 
giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes.”86  The U.N. released the 
Handbook in September of 1979, only six months before Congress passed the Refugee 
Act of 1980.87  The Handbook codified the U.N.’s interpretation of “social group” at that 
time, construing the term expansively.  As such, the Handbook states that “a ‘particular 
social group’ normally comprises persons of similar background, habits, or social 
status.”88  The concurrent timing of the release of this document with the Refugee Act’s 
passage, Congress’s clear legislative intent to comply with the Protocol, and Congress’s 
failure to change or add qualifications to the U.N.’s definition of “refugee,” demonstrate 
that Congress intended to adopt the U.N.’s interpretation of the word “refugee.”  
Accordingly, the UNHCR’s depiction of “social group” as a broad and adaptable term 
demonstrates that Congress intended an equally expansive construction of the same term 
in the Refugee Act.89  
Additionally, the legislature’s substantive purposes for enacting the Refugee Act 
demonstrate a congressional intent to apply the social group category as a flexible 
mechanism designed to be sensitive to the plights of victims of human rights violations, 
rather than a rigid test designed to exclude.  The drafters of the Refugee Act have 
articulated that they were motivated chiefly by a sense of duty to combat human rights 
abuses around the world.  According to Senator Edward Kennedy, a drafter of the 
legislation, the Refugee Act served to demonstrate the country’s “national commitment to 
human rights and humanitarian concerns.” 90   Furthermore, the Refugee Act itself 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
protection of that country.” U.N. Convention, supra note 80 at 153. Compare with the definition of refugee 
found at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A): “any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, 
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually 
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 
84 See Parish, supra note 8, at 924.   
85 Handbook of Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER 
FOR REFUGEES, http://www.hrea.org/learn/tutorials/refugees/Handbook/hbtoc.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) 
[hereinafter Handbook]. 
86 I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 (1987). 
87 See Handbook, supra note 85; Parish, supra note 8, at 929. 
88 Handbook, supra note 85, at ¶ 77. 
89 See Parish, supra note 8, at 929-30. 
90 S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 1 (1979). See also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436 (“If one thing is clear from 
the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of 	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explicitly states that the purpose for enacting it is to further “the historic policy of the 
United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their 
homelands, including . . . humanitarian assistance for their care and maintenance in 
asylum areas.”91  Congress’s emphasis on the Refugee Act’s function of responding to 
urgent needs around the world implies a sense of adaptability, meaning Congress 
intended the Refugee Act to confer benefits in a way that would account for constantly 
emerging events of humanitarian concern and not just according to limited, defined 
categories of refugees that existed at the time the statute was passed.   
The Refugee Act’s other objectives and the policies that it implemented further 
illustrate an inclusive intention.  For example, through the Refugee Act, Congress 
substantially increased the maximum number of refugees to whom the government could 
grant entry annually: from 17,400 per year to 50,000 per year.92  Furthermore, even if the 
United States filled its annual refugee quota, the Act provided “an orderly but flexible 
procedure” for granting admission to refugees of “special humanitarian concern.”93  
These added procedures convey Congress’s intent to assist emerging classes of 
refugees,94 rather than to execute asylum law in a rigid way that would exclude deserving 
people because of arbitrary standards. 
V.  THE U.N. AND INTERNATIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF “REFUGEE” 
In addition to fulfilling the legislative intent behind the INA, a broad interpretation 
of what constitutes a social group by U.S. courts would also be consistent with other 
nations’ legal interpretations of who should receive coverage under refugee laws.  As 
immigration law concerns the migration of people across national borders, international 
standards are particularly appropriate in assessing the merits of U.S. immigration law, 
including laws pertaining to refugees.95  While Marbury v. Madison96 famously held that 
U.S. courts have the power to “say what the law is”97 and thus to differentiate domestic 
law from international law, domestic law should still give weight to its international 
obligations and adhere to norms of international law.98  In construing this intent, it is 
helpful to consider the legislative history that led Congress to enact the statute in 
question.99  The legislative history leading to the insertion of “social group” into the INA 
provides no basis for diverging from the U.N. interpretation of the term.  Thus, as stated 
previously, because of the complete absence of congressional differentiation between the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United 
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”). 
91 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980). 
92 See Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 141, 143 (1981). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 See Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 
(1997) (“The regulation of transboundary migration inherently implicates relations between nation states. 
Refugee law, in particular, draws heavily upon agreed international standards.”).	  
96 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
97 Id. at 177. 
98 Fitzpatrick, supra note 95, at 2. 
99 See, e.g., United States v. Childress, 104 F.3d 47, 53 (4th Cir. 1996) (“If the language of the statute is 
unclear, the court may look to the legislative history for guidance in interpreting the statute.”). 
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Refugee Act’s “social group” and the Protocol’s “social group,” courts should construe 
this term equally in both contexts.  
 Furthermore, by incorporating the Protocol’s objectives and standards into U.S. 
law, Congress sought to influence other countries to follow suit.100  As T. David Parish 
notes, Congress’s use of the Protocol’s specific language “in giving meaning to terms 
within U.S. domestic law reflects the purpose underlying U.S. accession to the Protocol: 
setting an example to other nations by complying with international norms in dealing 
with refugees.”101  However, in practice, the U.S. has not set an example for other 
countries to follow, and countries around the world have surpassed the U.S. in their 
adherence to the U.N. Protocol.  
Diverging from international standards, the U.S. courts’ narrow application of 
“social group” is inconsistent with the U.N.’s guidance on the term and with the more 
expansive ways other countries interpret the term.  While some U.S. circuit courts have 
held that potential victims of human trafficking do not constitute a social group because 
their claimed social group is seemingly based solely on the persecution it suffers,102 other 
countries’ interpretations of what constitutes a social group reject this formulation. In 
particular, international standards have rejected the use of a “social visbility” test such as 
the one that was used by the Second Circuit in Lushaj. Instead, the immutability standard 
is the leading view among major common law states around the world.  For example, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom all use that standard in discerning social 
groups.103   
Furthermore, this social visibility test goes against the UNHCR’s 2002 guidelines 
regarding how to interpret what constitutes a social group. Those guidelines provide that 
“a particular social group is a group of persons who share a common characteristic other 
than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society.”104  While 
the guidelines also note that the visibility of a social group may be helpful in discerning 
it,105 there is no requirement that both an immutable characteristic and social visibility be 
present in order to constitute a social group, as some U.S. courts have imposed.  Thus, by 
diverging from this widely held view, U.S. courts have prevented victims of attempted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 See Parish, supra note 8, at 925-26 (“This goal was stressed at every stage of the Protocol’s ratification: 
in the State Department’s letter submitting the Protocol to the President, in the President’s letter of 
transmittal to the Senate, and in Senate discussion of the Protocol.”). 
101 Id. 
102 See, e.g., Kalaj v. Holder, 319 F. App’x 374, 377 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the claimant had not 
made a successful social group claim because her proffered social group contained “no such immutable 
group trait other than a generalized risk to women associated with the reportedly high levels of human 
trafficking in Albania”). 
103 See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular Social 
Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. 
POL’Y REV. 47, 56-57 (2008) (noting leading cases in each country that demonstrate “how the ‘protected 
characteristic’ approach set forth in Acosta has become ‘transnationalized.’”). 
104 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: “MEMBERSHIP OF A 
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR 
ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 3 (2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines], 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d36f23f4.html (emphasis added). 
105 Id. at 4. 
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trafficking from attaining asylum based on varying and contradictory standards for 
defining a social group. 
In addition to these general international understandings of what constitutes a social 
group for asylum purposes, international interpretations have also paid special attention 
to the gender aspects of social group claims.  For example, Canada has released a set of 
guidelines regarding how decisionmakers should interpret asylum claims in which gender 
plays a large role.106  These guidelines stipulate, “A group is not defined solely by 
common victimization if the claimant's fear of persecution is also based on her gender, or 
on another innate or unchangeable characteristic of the claimant.” 107   Under this 
framework, women who have experienced attempts at human trafficking are a social 
group, not because they are subject to human trafficking, but because they possess the 
traits of female gender, low socioeconomic status, and youth, on account of which 
traffickers persecute them.108   
Moreover, in 2002, the UNHCR released a set of guidelines that advocate an 
expansive interpretation of gender-based asylum claims in order to adhere to the 
Convention and the Protocol. These guidelines state that while “[t]he size of the group 
has sometimes been used as a basis for refusing to recognise ‘women’ generally as a 
particular social group,” this denial of asylum based on group size “has no basis in fact or 
reason, as the other grounds are not bound by this question of size.”109 
In accordance with the U.N.’s position on this matter, Canada’s guidelines stipulate 
that “the fact that the particular social group consists of large numbers of the female 
population in the country concerned is irrelevant—race, religion, nationality and political 
opinion are also characteristics that are shared by large numbers of people.”110  This 
reading appropriately conforms to the U.N.’s interpretation of the treaty’s language and 
rejects the unfounded notion that a social group’s size is sufficient to render it ineligible 
for asylum, despite the possibility that that group has been persecuted or has a well-
founded fear of persecution based on membership in that group. 
Ireland’s Refugee Act of 1996 demonstrates an even broader interpretation of the 
social group element, stating explicitly that it includes “membership of a group of 
persons whose defining characteristic is their belonging to the female or the male sex or 
having a particular sexual orientation.”111  While most countries have not construed the 
term so broadly as to grant asylum to people based solely on gender, gender is becoming 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act: Women 
Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender Related Persecution, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, 
http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/pol/guidir/Pages/women.aspx (last accessed March 4, 
2012) [hereinafter Canada Guidelines]. 
107 Id. at § 3. 
108 See Sangalis, supra note 15, at 414-15. 
109 UN HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: GENDER-RELATED 
PERSECUTION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR ITS 1967 
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 8 (2002), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3d36f1c64.html. 
110 Canada Guidelines, supra note 106, at § 3; see also Lori A. Nessel, “Willful Blindness” to Gender-
Based Violence Abroad: United States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 100 (2004). 
111 Refugee Act, 1996 (Act No. 17/1996) 1(1) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1996/en/act/
pub/0017/index.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2013 
288 	  
increasingly relevant in social group determinations when coupled with other 
characteristics that define a subset of people whose persecution is based on gender.112  
VI.  REMAINING ELEMENTS OF THE ASYLUM CLAIM 
By relying, as they should, on the broad interpretations of “social group” that 
Congress intended and to which international standards adhere, U.S. courts will be able to 
traverse the most significant barrier facing victims of attempted trafficking in making a 
successful claim for asylum.  The success of this social group claim, in turn, will enable 
courts to pay proper attention to the remaining elements of a successful asylum claim and 
grant these victims the relief they deserve. 
A.  Well-Founded Fear of Persecution 
 In addition to meeting the criteria to make a successful claim of membership in a 
social group, victims of attempted trafficking must also meet the second requirement 
under the INA of having a “well-founded fear of persecution.”  While there have been 
varying interpretations of this phrase in U.S. law, victims of attempted trafficking can 
demonstrate both reasonable objective and subjective fears of persecution based on the 
characteristics they share that link them to the fate of being trafficked, and the fact that 
they have already been targeted for an industry in which retribution for escape is a 
realistic fear.113   
The showing required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution has been 
construed differently, depending on the circuit, but the overarching rule of interpretation 
is that a showing of past persecution gives rise to a presumption of a well-founded fear of 
future persecution.114  However, according to the federal regulations governing asylum 
eligibility, a finder of fact may rebut this presumption if he or she decides that “[t]here 
has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a 
well-founded fear of persecution in the applicant's country of nationality,”115 or if the 
applicant could avoid this persecution by moving to another part of that country.116  If an 
applicant has not experienced past persecution, the establishment of a well-founded fear 
requires that the following three elements be met: the applicant for asylum must have a 
fear of persecution based on his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a social 
group, or political opinion; 117  there must be a “reasonable possibility” of facing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 See Martina Pomeroy, Left Out in the Cold: Trafficking Victims, Gender, and Misinterpretation of the 
Refugee Convention's “Nexus” Requirement, 16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 453, 468 (2010). 
113 See, e.g., LONDON SCHOOL OF HYGIENE AND TROPICAL MEDICINE, THE HEALTH RISKS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND ADOLESCENTS: FINDINGS FROM A EUROPEAN STUDY 26 
(2003), available at http://genderviolence.lshtm.ac.uk/files/health_risks__consequences_trafficking.pdf 
(describing potential consequences for escape as “[p]hysical or economic retribution for trying to escape, 
e.g., abduction of other female family members to pay off debts”).	  
114 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2012) (“An applicant who has been found to have established such past 
persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original 
claim.”). 
115 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). 
116 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). 
117 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(A). 
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persecution if the applicant returns to the country from which he or she has fled;118 and 
the applicant must be “unable or unwilling to return to, or avail himself or herself of the 
protection of, that country because of such fear.”119   
While courts have not applied this standard uniformly, most courts have required 
proof of an “objectively reasonable” fear in addition to the individual’s subjective fear of 
persecution.120  On paper, this standard aligns with the Handbook’s policy that an asylum 
seeker’s subjective fear “must be supported by an objective situation.”121  However, 
circuits have expressed different views as to what particular circumstances are sufficient 
to constitute an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. 
If verbal threats or physical attempts of abduction do not amount to the degree of 
severity necessary to establish a claim of past persecution, courts should nevertheless 
hold that those actions demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution.  As argued, 
traffickers target these women because of their membership in the social group of young, 
impoverished women in areas where trafficking is prevalent and, therefore, the 
persecution that they fear is based on their membership in that social group.  Secondly, 
the experience of having already been targeted by traffickers, in conjunction with the fact 
that reprisal by traffickers toward escapees and their families is common,122 demonstrates 
an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.123 The fear of a victim of attempted 
trafficking that traffickers may meet her upon her arrival in her native country is 
reasonable and legitimate, and it has been documented that some victims have been 
tracked by their former traffickers and swiftly re-trafficked.124     
While some circuits have found instances of a well-founded fear of persecution by 
applicants who have experienced threats of or attempts at persecution in other contexts,125 
there has been little support in U.S. courts for the protection of victims of attempted 
human trafficking or those threatened with such a fate.  In Rreshpja, for example, the 
Sixth Circuit declared that the plaintiff’s attacker’s attempted kidnapping and subsequent 
verbal threat about future forced prostitution was insufficient to demonstrate an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(B). 
119 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(C).  
120 See, e.g., Nzeve v. Holder, 582 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2009); Huang v. I.N.S., 421 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 
2005); Feleke v. I.N.S., 118 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 1997). 
121 Handbook, supra note 85, at ¶ 38. 
122 See Viviana Waisman, Human Trafficking: State Obligations to Protect Victims’ Rights, the Current 
Framework and a New Due Diligence Standard, 33 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385, 389 (2010). 
123 See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 527 F.3d 330, 348 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The objective 
experiences of Petitioner's family members, the threats she herself has received, and the country reports 
detailing the FARC’s tendency to take revenge for perceived wrongs against it, combine to satisfy the 
requirement that her fear of persecution be objectively reasonable.”). 
124 Cherish Adams, Re-Trafficked Victims: How a Human Rights Approach Can Stop the Cycle of 
Revictimization of Sex Trafficking Victims, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 201, 208 (2011). 
125 See, e.g., Canales-Vargas v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that a claimant had a “well-
founded fear of future persecution based on escalating threats she received after giving speeches criticizing 
terrorist organization”); Marcos v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Philippine national who, 
immediately before he fled to United States, had received three death threats over period of less than six 
months from communist militia with well-documented history of political violence, including the murder of 
its opponents, had well-founded fear of persecution, of kind making him eligible for asylum.”). 
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objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, despite the attacker’s conveyed intent of 
a repeat attempt.126    
Courts have recognized, as in Lleshanaku v. Ashcroft, 127  that “threats may 
constitute persecution, or give rise to a well-founded fear of future persecution, if the 
perpetrators have the ability and apparent inclination to carry through on their threats or 
actually attempt to do so.”128  Following this rationale, in Sarhan v. Holder,129 the 
Seventh Circuit determined that credible threats of “honor killing”130 against a Jordanian 
woman accused of adultery were sufficient for a successful asylum claim.  In that case, 
the plaintiff’s brother threatened to kill her because the plaintiff’s sister-in-law, who was 
known to have made false accusations of adultery in other instances, accused her of 
adultery.131  Since the plaintiff received an explicit threat that she would be murdered in 
the form of an honor killing,132 and because such honor killing was prevalent and socially 
significant in Jordan,133 the court ascribed credibility to the threats.134   
By comparison, many victims of attempted trafficking have received not only an 
explicit threat, but also an attempt to take the threatened action.  Additionally, these 
threats are commonly based on the prevalent social ill of the human trafficking business, 
and not on personal disputes.  Therefore, courts should use the rationales put forth in 
cases like Sarhan to find that threats against these victims of attempted trafficking are 
substantial and give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution.  It is notable that, in 
Sarhan, the plaintiff made a successful claim for withholding of removal, a standard that 
is even more difficult to meet than that of a successful claim for asylum.135  Thus, in 
applying the Sarhan court’s reasoning, victims of attempted trafficking would meet the 
less burdensome showing of a well-founded fear of persecution. 
B.  Government’s Unwillingness or Inability to Protect 
In addition to the showing of a protected group and a fear of persecution based on 
that group, a successful applicant for asylum must show that, owing to past persecution or 
a well-founded fear or future persecution, he or she is “unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection” of the country from which he or she has fled to avoid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005). 
127 100 F. App’x 546 (7th Cir. 2004). 
128 Id. at 548. 
129 658 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2011). 
130 “Honor killing” is the act of a woman’s family member murdering her for committing or being accused 
of committing supposed immoral acts, in the belief that the woman’s conduct has tarnished the family 
reputation and that killing her is necessary to restore it. Id. at 651. Such “immoral acts” may be as innocent 
as taking a walk with a male who is not the female’s relative.  Id. at 654. 
131 Id. at 651. 
132 Id. at 657. 
133 Id. at 656. 
134 Id. at 657. To make a successful withholding of removal claim under the Convention Against Torture, 
an applicant must show that the feared persecution is “more likely than not” to occur.  8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(b)(2) (2012).  
135 See Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 428 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Withholding of removal [is] a 
remedy that is similar to asylum . . . but that requires the applicant to establish a higher probability of 
persecution should he be returned to his native country.”). 
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such persecution. 136 It is clear that victims of attempted human trafficking easily meet 
this final requirement. 
Circuits have found evidence of governmental inability or unwillingness to protect 
claimants from persecution in a variety of contexts and countries, even in countries that 
have laws in place prohibiting the particular persecution at issue.  In Sarhan, for example, 
the Seventh Circuit recognized that, despite official government policies against honor 
killing, “[t]he government of Jordan [was] complicit in the harm” that the plaintiff would 
suffer if forced to return to Jordan.137  The court noted that the government prosecuted all 
seventeen reported honor killings in 2007, and that defendants were almost always found 
guilty.138 However, the Court found that the leniency of the defendants’ sentences 
demonstrated the government’s permissive attitude toward honor killings.139   
In countries such as Albania, where human trafficking is a pervasive problem, 
government corruption, collusion with traffickers, and ineffective protection from 
traffickers by law enforcement agents is common.  There also exists a substantial amount 
of evidence that law enforcement officials have direct involvement in the human 
trafficking industry.  According to the U.S. Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons 
Report for 2002, ten percent of trafficking victims reported that police were directly 
involved with their traffickers.140 Despite claims that the Albanian government had made 
efforts to curb human trafficking since that time, the Department of State’s 2011 
Trafficking in Persons Report notes that “[p]ervasive corruption in all levels and sectors 
of Albanian society continued to seriously affect the government’s ability to address its 
human trafficking problem.”141  For example, the Albanian government “did not report 
any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions” of officials complying with traffickers in 
2010.142   
Even without intentional government collusion in trafficking, the enforcement of 
anti-trafficking laws creates numerous challenges for state officials.  For example, the 
2005 Trafficking in Persons Report stated that “implementation of Albania's anti-
trafficking tools remained inadequate and a critical area of concern.”143  Although many 
government officials have a sincere desire to stop trafficking, it is an inherently difficult 
crime for them to prevent because traffickers conduct their business in unregulated 
industries, making it very hard to detect.144  The clandestine nature of trafficking and the 
reluctance of victims to report these crimes contribute to keeping trafficking hidden from 
government authorities.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 8 U.S.C. § 1101(A)(42)(A) (2012). 
137 Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 660. 
138 Id. at 658.   
139 Id. 
140 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2002 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 22 (2002), available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/10815.pdf. 
141 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2011 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 64 (2011), available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/164453.pdf [hereinafter 2011 TIP REPORT]. 
142 Id. 
143 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2005 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 52 (2005), available at: http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/47255.pdf. 
144 Marouf, supra note 103, at 100 (“In addition, victims of trafficking remain invisible because they are put 
to work in sectors that remain largely unregulated, including the sex industry, domestic services, and 
agriculture.”). 
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The 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report classifies Albania as a “Tier 2” country, 
meaning that it “does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of 
trafficking,” but that it has made attempts to do so.145  For example, Albania has allotted 
funding to non-governmental organizations working to fight trafficking, runs a “national 
toll-free, 24-hour hotline for victims and potential victims of trafficking,” and has 
appointed two anti-trafficking prosecutors in an attempt to improve litigation against 
traffickers.146  These measures, while certainly better than nothing, do not provide much 
direct assistance to victims and do not fully taking into account the unique aspects of 
trafficking that make it hard to prosecute. “Trafficking involves clandestine and illegal 
activity, widespread violence directed at the victims, and often violence directed at 
victim’s families,” therefore victims are reluctant to report crimes to the authorities.147 
Victims’ reasonable fear of reporting trafficking makes telephone hotlines and litigation 
improvements ineffective for many victims. 
Furthermore, the Albanian government’s efforts to provide more effective litigation 
for trafficking victims’ claims have been obstructed by governmental corruption.  The 
2011 Trafficking in Persons Report noted that “widespread corruption, particularly 
within the judiciary, continued to hamper overall anti-trafficking law enforcement and 
victim protection efforts.”148  These problems have persisted for years.149  It could take a 
long time before the legal and enforcement measures the Albanian government employs 
to address the problem become effective at protecting trafficking victims.   
Despite considerable evidence of the Albanian government’s involvement in the 
persistence of trafficking, and its inability to curb the problem effectively, there has been 
little jurisprudence to support findings of government inability or unwillingness to protect 
trafficking victims and those vulnerable to becoming trafficking victims.  Most circuits 
that have confronted the issue of asylum eligibility for victims of attempted trafficking 
rejected plaintiffs’ social group claims, and, thus, declined to rule on the element of 
government ineffectiveness.  In Rreshpja, for example, the court did not expound upon 
the government’s inability or unwillingness to protect victims of attempted trafficking for 
the purposes of adjudicating the asylum claim.150  However, the plaintiff’s futile police 
report regarding the attempted kidnapping, after which “the police told Rreshpja that the 
information she had provided was insufficient to identify or arrest the man who had 
attacked her,” illuminates the difficulty of relying on law enforcement officials to locate 
and prosecute traffickers.151 
While most courts have not taken the opportunity to make rulings about the 
unwillingness or inability of government officials to protect claimants of attempted 
trafficking from persecution, agency determinations with regard to the issue are troubling.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 2011 TIP REPORT, supra note 141, at 64. 
146 Id. at 65. 
147 Waisman, supra note 122, at 389. 
148 2011 TIP REPORT, supra note 141, at 64 (emphasis added). 
149 See DANIEL RENTON, SAVE THE CHILDREN, CHILD TRAFFICKING IN ALBANIA 10 (2001), available at 
http://www.childtrafficking.org/pdf/user/child_trafficking_in_albania_save_the_children.pdf (“Since the 
collapse of communism in 1991, Albania has emerged as a major source of trafficked women and girls.”). 
150 The court did, however, reject the plaintiff’s claim under the Convention Against Torture that the 
government acquiesced in trafficking. See Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 2005). 
151 Id. at 553. 
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In Kalaj, for example, the Sixth Circuit’s denial of the plaintiff’s social group claim led 
the court not to consider her claim of inadequate government protection against 
persecution.152  In the agency decision the Sixth Circuit was reviewing, however, the BIA 
determined that the plaintiff “failed to show that the Albanian government was unwilling 
or unable to protect her” from future trafficking.153  
In Nesimi v. Gonzales, the First Circuit found that conditions in Albania had 
improved and found an insufficient showing of government acquiescence in the 
claimant’s persecution by traffickers.154  In doing so, the First Circuit cited evidence 
found in reports, such as the U.S. Department of State’s Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices from 2003 and 2004.155  However, the First Circuit seemed to have 
ignored evidence found in those exact same reports that discussed government 
acquiescence in trafficking.  The Country Report on Human Rights Practices from 2003, 
for example, stated explicitly that “[p]olice corruption and involvement in trafficking was 
a problem.”156 
  The First Circuit’s decision in Nesismi is an example of ignorance towards the 
statutory mandate that courts must review the factual determinations that agencies make, 
not based solely on the evidence that supports an agency’s decision, but based on the 
“record considered as a whole.”157  Thus, in finding that a state’s enactment of police 
methods against trafficking is sufficient to produce country conditions that constitute 
adequate government protection from traffickers, courts do not give enough consideration 
to the invisibility of trafficking.  This reading of the facts does not align with the 
UNHCR’s guidelines, which state that “[w]hether the authorities in the country of origin 
are able to protect victims or potential victims of trafficking” depends on “whether 
legislative and administrative mechanisms have been put in place to prevent and combat 
trafficking, as well as to protect and assist the victims and on whether these mechanisms 
are effectively implemented in practice.”158  In relying exclusively on the existence of 
laws against trafficking, the First Circuit ignored other information within the same 
reports demonstrating that these policies were not effective in practice.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that victims of attempted human trafficking constitute a particular social 
group eligible for asylum under the INA, and sorely need grants of asylum to escape fates 
that could entail psychological torture, rape, physical violence, and enslavement.  While 
most circuits have held that victims of human trafficking do not comprise a specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Kalaj v. Holder, 319 F. App’x 374, 377 (6th Cir. 2009). 
153 Id. at 374. 
154 233 F. App’x 11, 12 (1st Cir. 2007). 
155 Id. 
156 Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003: Albania, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, sec. 6(f) (Feb. 25, 
2004) http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27820.htm. 
157 I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (2012)). 
158 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION NO. 7: THE 
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE 
STATUS OF REFUGEES TO VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING AND PERSONS AT RISK OF BEING TRAFFICKED 9 
(2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/443679fa4.html (emphasis added). 
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social group entitled to asylum under the INA, some of these victims are eligible for T-
visas, which permit them to remain in the U.S. on the basis of the hardships they have 
suffered in being trafficked.159  However, while most circuits have also rejected the social 
group claim for targets of human trafficking whose assailants have not (yet) successfully 
trafficked them, those at risk of becoming trafficking victims are not eligible for T-visas 
and have little other recourse if their asylum claims are unsuccessful.160   
By denying the refugee status of victims of human trafficking attempts, U.S. courts 
are creating a perverse policy that requires this group to experience the extreme 
psychological and physical torment that trafficking induces before the U.S. offers them 
any protection.  Despite official legislation suggesting otherwise, the discrepancy 
“between available domestic protection and the imperatives of international obligation 
results in a serious denial of justice to many asylum-seekers.”161  Instead of restricting 
refugee eligibility so severely, U.S. courts should carry out the intention to prevent 
human rights abuses for which Congress enacted the Refugee Act.  Thus, under current 
U.S. policy, in order for courts to provide victims of attempted trafficking with an escape 
from this very real threat of persecution, they must first be persecuted.  Sadly, if these 
women are trafficked, then ineffective government prosecution of traffickers and the use 
by traffickers of violence, threats of violence against family members, and psychological 
manipulation to keep these women enslaved all raise doubts that these victims will 
receive another opportunity to escape.162 
As it stands today, U.S. courts are applying arbitrarily exclusionary standards that 
thwart the intentions of the drafters of the Refugee Act and serve to endanger genuine 
refugees. Instead, the U.S. judicial system should interpret the asylum claims of victims 
of attempted trafficking in accordance with the humanitarian concerns that led to the 
Refugee Act and the inclusive U.N. and international interpretations of refugee law.  
Only then will the purposes of the Refugee Act be fulfilled and will victims of attempted 
human trafficking be able to rebuild their terrorized lives anew in the United States. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Michael A. Scaperlanda, Human Trafficking in the Heartland: Greed, Visa Fraud, and the Saga of 53 
Indian Nationals "Enslaved" by a Tulsa Company, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 219, 221 (2005); see also 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T). 
160 Victims of attempted trafficking may also make a claim for “withholding of removal” under the 
Convention Against Torture, but this standard is even more difficult to meet than that of an asylum claim.  
See Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 428 (7th Cir. 2009).  “If the applicant's fear of future threat to 
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161 Fitzpatrick, supra note 95, at 3.	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